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DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES AS
A WAR CRIME: AMERICA’S FAILED EFFORTS
TO CHANGE THE LAW OF WAR†
David J. R. Frakt*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent armed conflicts, there have been a large number of
participants who have engaged in hostilities but do not qualify as
prisoners of war (“POW”) under the Geneva Convention III, Article 4.
That is, they are not “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict” or qualifying militia, volunteer corps, organized resistance
movements, or levee en masse.1 Such persons are often referred to as
“unprivileged belligerents” because they are not entitled to the privilege
of being treated as POWs if captured, nor are they entitled to combatant
immunity for lawful acts of war—under POW status.2 A synonym for
unprivileged belligerents that has gained widespread use over the past
decade is “unlawful combatants.”3 While some unprivileged belligerents
†
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1
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. IV, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see INT’L COMM. OF RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 20 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc-002-0990.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
2
GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 20; see Major Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged
Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 328 (1951) (defining
unprivileged belligerents as “persons who are not entitled to treatment either as peaceful
civilians or as prisoners of war by reason of the fact that they have engaged in hostile
conduct without meeting the qualifications established by Article 4 of the Geneva Prisoners
of War Convention of 1949”); Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants,
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, Program on Humanitarian Pol’y &
Conflict Res., Harv. U., Occasional Paper Series No. 2, Winter 2005, available at
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper2.pdf.
3
The term “unlawful combatant” is misleading in that it implies (incorrectly as
discussed in this Article) that it is a war crime to engage in combat. See infra Part III.

729

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

730

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

are essentially full-time combatants belonging to organized armed
groups, there have also been significant numbers of individuals who
participate in armed conflicts on a sporadic or temporary basis, often
while maintaining other civilian occupations. The phrase “farmer-byday, fighter-by-night” has frequently been used to describe such
persons.4 The official term for them under international humanitarian
law (“IHL”) is “Direct Participants in Hostilities” (“DPH”).
The involvement of civilian DPHs in armed conflicts is a vexing
problem for the professional armed forces who oppose them, primarily
because such persons typically do not distinguish themselves (such as by
wearing a uniform) from the civilian population with which they
associate. Although a good deal of effort has been devoted in recent
years to discussion of the DPH problem, there is much that is still
unclear about their legal status and how the laws of war apply to them.
One area of agreement about DPH is that: “Civilians who take up
arms . . . lose their immunity from attack during the time they are
participating in hostilities—whether permanently, intermittently, or only
Because civilians who
once—and become legitimate targets.”5
participate in hostilities can be targeted directly by the military forces
they oppose, precisely defining the conduct that qualifies as DPH is a
critically important exercise for the modern war-fighter. Accordingly,
IHL experts have expended much effort to provide clear detailed
guidance on DPH. The most important effort to clarify the concept of
direct participation in hostilities was spearheaded by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), which, in 2003, embarked on a
multi-year effort to reach a consensus among IHL experts.6 Although the
ICRC convened several meetings involving numerous distinguished
experts between 2003 and 2008, ultimately there were too many areas of
contention to produce a unified document. But the ICRC determined
that because there was sufficient consensus in key areas, and a
substantial need for direction to military personnel in the field, that it
4
Dinah PoKempner et al., Off Target on the Iraq Campaign: A Response to Professor
Schmitt, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 111, 118 (2003); see GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 12, 72.
5
Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law
of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 63 (2010); see also Avril
McDonald, The Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and the Principles of Distinction
and Protection from the Increased Participation of Civilians in Hostilities 30 (Univ. of Teheran &
Harvard Univ. Humanitarian Law Research Initiative on the Interplay Between Int’l
Humanitarian Law & Int’l Human Rights Law, Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=9&level1=13337&level2=13379 (“The most
serious consequence of taking a direct part in hostilities has already been alluded to: the
civilian loses his or her protected status and may be attacked, for the duration of his or her
participation, however long that is determined to be.”).
6
See GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 9–10.
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should publish some guidance.
In 2009, the ICRC released its
“Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law” (“Guidance”).7
Since the release of this seminal document, there have been
numerous law review articles critiquing it (including several by experts
who participated in the process). In this volume, the reader will find
additional discussions of the Guidance.8 There is a great deal of debate
on certain aspects of DPH, particularly what actions short of direct
attacks on enemy armed forces constitute direct participation in
hostilities; whether there is an obligation to use the least force necessary
when attacking DPHs; and when a civilian regains protection after direct
participation in hostilities.9 Another important question is what to do
with DPHs who are not killed by opposing armed forces, but are
captured. The right to target and kill civilians who directly participate in
hostilities (combatants) is the ultimate power in war, and by law and
implication includes the right to capture and detain them. The
appropriate treatment of DPHs and the detainer’s rights and
responsibilities have been highly divisive subjects over the last decade.
One important aspect of the debate revolves around the potential
criminal prosecution of detained DPHs. The ability to detain provides
an opportunity to the detaining power to prosecute the DPH “for an

See id.
See Iain D. Pedden, Lex Lacunae: The Merging Laws of War and Human Rights in
Counterinsurgency, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 803, 813–15 (2012); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Introduction:
Targeting in an Asymmetrical World, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 701–03 (2012).
9
See Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in
Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International
Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637 (2010); Nils
Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831 (2010); Michael Meyer & Charles Garraway, Clearing the Fog
of War? The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, 59 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 180 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities”
Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010);
Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 5 (2010); Major Richard S. Taylor, The Capture Versus Kill Debate: Is the Principle of
Humanity Now Part of the Targeting Analysis when Attacking Civilians who are Directly
Participating in Hostilities?, 2010 ARMY LAW. 103 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost:
Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive
Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641 (2010).
7
8
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offence arising out of the hostilities.”10 But is it a crime for someone who
does not meet the Geneva Convention requirements for POW status to
directly participate in hostilities? In other words, are all DPHs
criminals? If so, are they war criminals, or, rather, common domestic
criminals? Contrary to the prevailing international view, the United
States has attempted, through the military commissions of Guantánamo,
to treat direct participation in hostilities as a war crime. This Article
examines that effort.
II. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES IS NOT AN INTERNATIONALLY
RECOGNIZED WAR CRIME
As Professor Schmitt has noted, “[c]urrently contentious is the issue
of whether mere direct participation, without more, is a war crime.”11 If
not a war crime, then the acts constituting direct participation would
only be punishable under domestic law. Schmitt concludes that direct
participation is not a war crime:
Despite dated support for the assertion that being an
unprivileged belligerent can constitute a war crime, the
better position is that only the acts underlying direct
participation are punishable. If they amount to war
crimes (for example, killing civilians), the acts may be
tried as such. Further, because civilians who directly
participate lack combatant immunity, they may be
convicted for offenses against the domestic law of a State
that enjoys both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
This is the position proffered by leading scholars, as well
as that in operational guidance such as the US Army’s
Operational Law Handbook (2004).12

10
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 45, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
11
Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private
Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 520 (2005).
12
Id. at 520–21 (footnotes omitted). The “dated support” Professor Schmitt references
comes from The United Nations War Crimes Commission, 15 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 89 (1949) and Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For a critique of the Quirin
decision on this point, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 234 (2004); George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and Its
Pathologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 541 (2007) (referring to “the giant leap from
the status of failing to qualify as a lawful combatant to the crime of being an unlawful
combatant” in Quirin as “one of the greatest legal fallacies” ever); David J. R. Frakt,
Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367, 1384 (2011);
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The ICRC Guidance is even more unequivocal in stating that directly
participating in hostilities does not violate the law of war:
[IHL] neither prohibits nor privileges civilian direct
participation
in
hostilities. . . . [Therefore,
such
participation does not in itself constitute a war crime.
However, civilians having directly participated in
hostilities can be prosecuted for any offence that they
may have committed under domestic law even if, in
doing so, they did not violate IHL.] The absence in IHL
of an express right for civilians to directly participate in
hostilities does not necessarily imply an international
prohibition of such participation. Indeed, as such,
civilian direct participation in hostilities is neither
prohibited by IHL nor criminalized under the statutes of
any prior or current international criminal tribunal or
court.13
The Guidance notes that:
Neither the statutes of the Military Tribunals that
followed the Second World War (i.e. the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo), nor the
current statutes of the [International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)], the [International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)], the
[International Criminal Court (“ICC”)] and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) penalize civilian direct
participation in hostilities as such.14
While many aspects of the Guidance are controversial and the subject of
considerable debate among experts, the assertion that “[IHL] neither
prohibits
nor
privileges
civilian
direct
participation
in

Major E. John Gregory, Trying Unlawful Combatants at General Courts-Martial: Amending the
UCMJ in Light of the Military Commissions Experience, 203 MIL. L. REV. 150, 167 (2010)
(“Notwithstanding contrary language from Quirin, a mere lack of combatant immunity
does not automatically render an accused’s offense a violation of the law of war.” (footnote
omitted)).
13
GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 83–84 (footnote omitted).
14
Id. at 84 n.226.
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hostilities . . . certainly reflects the view of those who took part in the
expert meetings.”15
III. THE ATTEMPTED CRIMINALIZATION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES BY THE UNITED STATES
Although the Guidance was quite correct in noting that no
international war crimes tribunal categorizes direct participation in
hostilities as a war crime, the Guidance failed to note that the United
States, through President Bush’s Executive Order that created military
tribunals,16 and subsequently through the Military Commissions Act
(“MCA”) of 2006 and 2009,17 has attempted to do exactly that, albeit
without using this exact terminology. Both the abortive Executive Order
establishing military tribunals for Guantánamo detainees, and the
subsequent federal legislation creating military commissions ostensibly
make direct participation in hostilities into a crime punishable by the
detaining power under the law of war. While there is significant
controversy at the margins about what constitutes DPH, there are certain
activities that unquestionably qualify. The clearest examples are direct
attacks on lawful combatants (uniformed soldiers of a state party
involved in the conflict) in a zone of conflict intended to kill or seriously
injure them. Similarly, a direct attack on military equipment in the zone
of conflict—such as tanks and other military vehicles, artillery pieces,
and military aircraft—is indisputably DPH. According to the ICRC
Guidance, “inflicting death, injury, or destruction” on military personnel
and objects constitutes DPH.18 In fact, “[t]he use of weapons or other
means to commit acts of violence against human and material enemy
forces is probably the most uncontroversial example of direct
participation in hostilities.”19 These are precisely the acts that U.S. law
now criminalizes. Indeed (as will be discussed more fully below), the
United States has actually prosecuted, with mixed success, individual
civilians for attacks on lawful targets, and continues to assert the
authority to do so under the MCA of 2009 and its implementing
regulation, the Manual for Military Commissions (“MMC”).

A.P.V. Rogers, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Some Personal Reflections, 48 MIL. L. &
L. WAR REV. 143, 155–56 (2009).
16
Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
17
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w (2006 & Supp. II 2009); see also Jonathan Hafetz, Redefining
State Power and Individual Rights in the War on Terrorism, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 843, 849 (2012)
(“Congress has twice legislated various offenses triable by military commissions.”).
18
GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 47.
19
Id. at 47 n.96.
15
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A. President Bush’s Early Military Tribunals
The first attempt by the United States to seek the criminalization of
DPH was introduced in the penal code implementing regulation for the
military commissions,20 which was established by executive order on
November 13, 2001.21 This regulation included the new offense of
“Murder by an unprivileged belligerent,” which applied to all murders
in the context of armed conflict by one who did not “enjoy combatant
immunity.”22 The term “unprivileged belligerent,” while not coextensive
with “DPH,” unquestionably includes civilians who directly participate
in hostilities. Specifically, unprivileged belligerent, according to the
MCA:
means an individual (other than a privileged belligerent)
who—
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners;
(B) has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners; or
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged
offense under this chapter.23
Thus, under the MCA, although the definition of unprivileged
belligerents included persons other than civilian DPHs, civilians
engaged in hostilities against the United States are clearly not privileged.
A comment in the regulation defining these offenses indicated that
the lawfulness of the target under IHL was irrelevant if the attacker was
a civilian directly participating in hostilities: “Even an attack on a soldier
would be a crime if the attacker did not enjoy ‘belligerent privilege’ or
‘combatant immunity.’”24 No authority was offered to support this
proposition. As Professor Schmitt has noted, under “humanitarian law,
combatants enjoy no general protection from attack.”25 Professor
Schmitt further acknowledged:
32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2005).
Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833.
22
32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(3) (emphasis omitted).
23
10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (Supp. III 2010) (emphasis added). “The term ‘privileged
belligerent’ means an individual belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” Id.
§ 948a(6). “The term ‘hostilities’ means any conflict subject to the laws of war.” Id.
§ 948a(9).
24
32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(3)(ii)(B) (2005).
25
Schmitt, supra note 11, at 520.
20
21

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

736

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

No treaty (including the statutes governing international
courts such as the [ICC, ICTY], and [ICTR] suggests that
targeting a combatant is unlawful. Rather, combatants
are only protected from attack when they are hors de
combat because they have surrendered, are sick or
wounded and not carrying on the fight, are
shipwrecked, or have parachuted from a disabled
aircraft.26
The penal code included a separate offense, “Willful killing of
protected persons,”27 to encompass attacks on such persons “protected
under the law of war.”28
In addition to criminalizing attacks on soldiers, the penal code also
criminalized attacks on military property through the offense of
“Destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent.”29 Although the
elements of this offense did not specify that military property qualified,
it is clear from the context that the offense was intended to cover military
property rather than civilian property because the penal code separately
listed the offense of “Attacking civilian objects.”30 The elements of that
offense specified that this provision applied only when “[t]he object of
the attack was civilian property, that is, property that was not a military
objective.”31 The regulation also listed a separate crime for “Attacking
Protected Property,”32 (property with protected status under the law of
war), leaving military property as the only type of property not explicitly
covered by the other crimes.33
The Department of Defense (“DOD”), which issued the
implementing regulation, asserted that these offenses were nothing new,
stating: “These crimes and elements derive from the law of armed
conflict, a body of law that is sometimes referred to as the law of war.
They constitute violations of the law of armed conflict or offenses that,
consistent with that body of law, are triable by military commission.”34
The regulation further stated that the “list of crimes triable by military
Id. n.44.
32 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)(1) (2005).
28
Id. § 11.6(a)(1)(C).
29
Id. § 11.6(b)(4).
30
Id. § 11.6(a)(3) (emphasis omitted); see id. (recognizing that only unprivileged
belligerents were subject to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, and thus the offense
could just as well have been called attacking civilian objects by an unprivileged belligerent).
31
Id. § 11.6(a)(3)(i)(B).
32
See id. § 11.6(a)(4) (emphasis omitted).
33
Given that all attacks on property of any kind by unprivileged belligerents were
criminalized, it is not clear why three separate offenses were thought to be required.
34
Id. § 11.3(a).
26
27
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commission . . . [was] intended to be illustrative of applicable principles
of the common law of war.”35 While many of the offenses listed in the
penal code were unquestionably part of the law of war (e.g., grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention), criminalizing direct participation in
hostilities was a novel and untested concept.
Of course, this initial attempt at establishing military commissions
was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in the
summer of 2006,36 before any “unprivileged belligerent” was ever
convicted of an offense based on direct participation in hostilities, or any
other offense. But the Bush administration was determined to prosecute
at least some detainees in military commissions, including civilians who
had allegedly directly participated in hostilities. Shortly after Hamdan,
the administration submitted proposed legislation to Congress
authorizing the creation of military commissions.
B. The MCA
In October 2006, President Bush signed into law the MCA of 2006.37
Congress largely incorporated the list of criminal offenses from the prior
DOD regulation into the MCA, with a couple of exceptions. The offense
“Murder by an unprivileged belligerent” was replaced with the offense of
“Murder in Violation of the Law of War,”38 while the related offense,
“Destruction of [P]roperty by an [U]nprivileged [B]elligerent” was
similarly amended to “Destruction of Property in Violation of The Law
of War.”39
Initially, it was not clear if Congress intended “Murder in Violation
of the Law of War” to be substantively different than “Murder by an
unprivileged belligerent” or was simply a cosmetic name change.40 The
definition of the offense referenced the killing of “lawful combatants,”
35
Id. § 11.3(c). But see id. § 11.6 (noting, interestingly, that the offenses of murder and
destruction of property “by an unprivileged belligerent” were not identified as
“[s]ubstantive offenses—war crimes,” but rather as “[s]ubstantive offenses—other offenses triable
by military commission”). This suggests that the drafters of the MCA were aware that such
conduct could not properly be characterized as a war crime. The authority for trying nonwar crimes in a military commission, particularly when regular courts are open for
business, is unclear.
36
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
37
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w (2006).
38
See id. § 950v(b)(15) (replacing the “Murder by an unprivileged belligerent” offense from
32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(3)).
39
See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(16) (replacing “Destruction of property by an underprivileged
belligerent” offense from 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(4)).
40
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15) (providing the text of Murder in Violation of the Law
of War), with 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(3) (presenting the text of Murder by an unprivileged
belligerent).
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but also specified that such killing should be “in violation of the law of
war,”41 a requirement not specifically included in the elements of
Murder by an unprivileged belligerent under the DOD regulation.
Regardless of Congress’ intent, the DOD interpreted the new offense to
be identical to its predecessor by defining the new element of a law of
war violation as being satisfied by simply being an unprivileged
belligerent. According to a comment in the MMC (the implementing
regulation for the MCA),42 “[f]or the accused to have been acting in
violation of the law of war, the accused must have taken acts as a
combatant without having met the requirements for lawful
combatancy.”43 Taking acts as a combatant, or direct participation in
hostilities was deemed a per se violation of the law of war.44
This comment also cross-referenced two other offenses:
“Destruction of [P]roperty in [V]iolation of the [L]aw of [W]ar” (making
it a crime for an unlawful combatant to destroy any property belonging
to another), and a newly introduced offense—“Intentionally causing
serious bodily injury.”45 The now defunct DOD regulation for the
original military tribunals had listed an offense of “Causing serious
injury” as a war crime, but the elements of the offense made no reference
to privileged belligerents as a class of victims.46 Rather, the only victims
covered were persons “in the custody or under the control of the
accused.”47 It is a recognized war crime and a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions to cause serious injury to a protected person.48
41
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15) (using the phrase “lawful combatants” in the
definition of the Murder in Violation of the Law of War crime), with id. § 950t(15) (Supp. III
2009) (changing lawful combatants to “privileged belligerents”).
42
U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. IV, § 6(15)(b), at IV–12 (2007). The elements
of the offense are as follows:
(1) [o]ne or more persons are dead;
(2) [t]he death [or deaths] of the persons resulted from the act or
omission of the accused;
(3) [t]he killing was unlawful;
(4) [t]he accused intended to kill the person or persons;
(5) [t]he killing was in violation of the law of war; and
(6) [t]he killing took place in the context of and was associated with
an armed conflict.
Id.
43
Id. § 6(13)d, at IV–11.
44
See Frakt, supra note 12, at 1383–85 (implying that there remains little or no legal
support for this assertion).
45
10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(13), (16) (2006).
46
See 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)(12) (2011).
47
Id.
48
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, ¶2(a)(iii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 90, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_
statute(e).pdf; Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
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Persons under the custody or control of enemy belligerents are protected
persons. The description of the new offense “Intentionally causing
serious bodily injury” in the MCA is not limited to such detained
persons, and specifically included “lawful combatants.”49
The MCA’s penal code also includes the inchoate offense of
“Attempt[],” making any intentional attempt to commit another listed
offense punishable to the same extent as the target offense.50 Ultimately,
under the 2006 MCA, any attacks aimed at seriously injuring or killing a
U.S. or coalition soldier, or destroying U.S. or coalition military property,
successful or otherwise, was considered a crime punishable by a military
commission. According to U.S. law, all direct participation in hostilities
by an unlawful combatant was a war crime.
IV. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF INDIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
The United States actually went beyond merely criminalizing DPH;
indirect participation in hostilities is also punishable by a military
tribunal. Under IHL, those who indirectly participate in hostilities are
not lawful targets of attack, but, according to the United States, they may
nevertheless be lawful targets for prosecution as war criminals. The
MCA authorizes punishment for several offenses that are appropriately
characterized as indirect participation in hostilities. First, there is the
crime of solicitation, which punishes “[a]ny person . . . who solicits or
advises another or others to commit one or more substantive offenses
triable” under the MCA.51
Thus, asking or encouraging another to directly participate in
hostilities against the United States or our coalition partners (by
attacking our forces or materiel) is a punishable offense under the MCA.
The controversial offense of Material Support to Terrorism, another
freshly invented war crime, allows for the punishment of even more
indirect participation in hostilities by subjecting those “who intentionally
Yugoslavia, art. 2(c), Sept. 2008, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Statute/statute_sept08_en.pdf; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
3146, 75 U.N.T.S 31, 62; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 116; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 238; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388.
49
10 U.S.C § 950v(b)(13)(a). The phrase “privileged belligerents” was substituted for
“lawful combatants” in the 2009 MCA. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50
10 U.S.C § 950t.
51
10 U.S.C § 950u.
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provide[] material support or resources to an international terrorist
organization engaged in hostilities against the United States” to
prosecution.52
The 2006 MCA gave jurisdiction to the military commissions over an
unlawful enemy combatant, defined as a person “who has engaged in
hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant.”53 Thus, proof of direct or indirect participation in hostilities
served both to establish both the basis for jurisdiction under the MCA
and that an offense was committed.
V. THE PROSECUTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
The fact that both direct and indirect participation in hostilities were
made punishable under the MCA should have meant that virtually all
52
Id. § 950v(b)(25); see, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Promotion and
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including
the Right to Development:
Addendum, Human Rights Council 12, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/6/17/Add.3 (Nov. 22, 2007) (by Martin Scheinin) (“[T]he offences listed in Section
950v(24)–(28) of the [MCA] (terrorism, providing material support for terrorism,
wrongfully aiding the enemy, spying, and conspiracy) go beyond offences under the laws
of war.”); PETER VICKERY ET AL., ADVICE: IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGALITY OF THE CHARGE
AGAINST DAVID HICKS 4 (2007), available at http://cigj.anu.edu.au/cigj/link_documents/
Media/LCA-Hicks_Advice_8_March_2007.pdf (“[T]here is no agreed definition of the
international crime of terrorism in the Law of War as it currently stands and so there can be
no crime of ‘providing material support for terrorism’ in the Law of War either.”); George
P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 427, 446 (2007) (“[N]either conspiracy nor membership in a terrorist
organization meets the standards of an international crime acceptable to the leading legal
systems of the world.”); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil
over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 177 (2008)
(“[W]hile providing material support to terrorism is clearly an offense against U.S. federal
law, its trial as a war crime seems unprecedented.” (footnote omitted)). But see United
States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1268 (U.S. Ct. Military Comm’n Review 2011) (en
banc) (explaining that material support to terrorism is properly within Congress’ authority
to define and punish war crimes and is consistent with the law of war).
53
10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i). The term unlawful enemy combatant was changed to
“[u]nprivileged [e]nemy [b]elligerent” in 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (Supp. III 2009). The revised
MCA also changed the term “co-belligerents” to “coalition partners.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7)
(Supp. III 2009). The statute provides the following:
The term “unprivileged enemy belligerent” means an individual (other
than a privileged belligerent) who—
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners;
(B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners; or
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this
chapter.
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lawful detainees at Guantánamo were subject to prosecution under the
MCA. The current standard for detention, asserted by the United States
in habeas corpus litigation in March 2009, is, in pertinent part:
The President has the authority to detain persons that
the President determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those
responsible for those attacks. The President also has the
authority to detain persons who were part of, or
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners, including any
person who has committed a belligerent act, or has
directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy
armed forces.54
Comparing this definition to the jurisdictional provision of the MCA
suggests that any detainee who met the standard for detention should
also have been prosecutable under the MCA. Certainly, any detainee
who had directly participated in hostilities against the United States was
eligible for prosecution. In practice, only a small fraction of detainees
were considered suitable candidates for prosecution,55 and only a small
number of prosecutions have been attempted. Disturbingly, of seven
persons convicted in military commissions thus far (two by trial, five by
guilty plea), none have been prosecuted for any war crimes recognized
by modern international war crimes tribunals. Rather, as described
below, in five of seven cases, they have been charged and convicted
solely of terrorism offenses.56 In two of these cases, direct participation
in hostilities served, at least in part, as the factual predicate for the
convictions. In the sixth and seventh cases, the charges combined
Id.
54
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation,
No.
08-0442
(D.D.C.
filed
March
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
55
GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ii (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. At most, about seventyfive of the nearly eight hundred persons detained at Guantánamo were seriously
considered for prosecution. Id. at ii, 2. After a review by the Obama administration of all
remaining detainees, about three dozen were considered solid candidates for prosecution.
Id. at ii.
56
See infra Part V.A.1–5 (providing the terrorism offenses, including terrorism, material
support to terrorism, and conspiracy (to commit acts of terrorism)).
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terrorism offenses, spying,57 and the new offenses under the MCA
explicitly designed to criminalize direct participation in hostilities. In
addition to the seven cases resulting in conviction, one other commission
case, which was based exclusively on alleged direct participation in
hostilities, was dismissed during pre-trial litigation.
A. Prosecutions under the MCA of 2006
1.

David Hicks

The first person to be convicted by military commission, in March
2007, was an Australian, David Hicks. Hicks pled guilty to one charge of
material support to terrorism. A review of the charges to which he pled
guilty, and the factual predicate for them, reveals that his conviction was
largely based on attending al Qaeda training camps before 9/11, and
fighting, or attempting to fight, U.S. and coalition forces in the fall of
2001 in Afghanistan. Hicks admitted to traveling from Pakistan into
Afghanistan and joining front-line Taliban and al Qaeda forces in
Kunduz as a combatant during active hostilities. The charge against
Hicks is of dubious validity, and it is clear that he pled guilty solely
because of the highly favorable plea offer negotiated by his defense
counsel.58 Certainly, there is no legal basis under the law of war for
punishing an Australian citizen for attending a training camp in
Afghanistan during peacetime. And it is not clear why engaging in
combat with opposing armed forces in an international armed conflict
supports a charge of providing material support to terrorism.59 There
was no evidence tying Hicks to any terrorist attacks on civilians. In
essence, Hicks was prosecuted for his voluntary and direct participation
in hostilities against the United States.60

57
10 U.S.C. § 950t(27). Acts of espionage are not prohibited under the law of armed
conflict and are not war crimes. However, spies are not entitled to protection as prisoners
of war and may be prosecuted under the domestic law of the capturing state. Spying is an
offense traditionally triable by a military tribunal.
58
Hicks received a nine month sentence, which he was allowed to serve in Australia,
then released.
59
At the time of Mr. Hicks’ involvement, the United States and coalition forces were
engaged in an international armed conflict with the Taliban, then the Afghanistan
government.
60
See Schmitt, supra note 11, at 520 (referring to an earlier attempted prosecution of
David Hicks under President Bush’s executive order authorizing military tribunals,
scholar, Michael N. Schmitt, noted that Hicks’ alleged crimes did not appear to violate the
law of war, and surmised “[p]erhaps, then, prosecution [was] based on Hicks’ alleged
status as an unprivileged belligerent”).
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Salim Hamdan

The next person to be convicted by military commission was Salim
Hamdan, Osama bin Ladin’s driver. Although charged with multiple
specifications of conspiracy and providing material support to terrorism,
Hamdan was acquitted of the most serious charges.61 He was convicted
of providing material support to terrorism. His conviction was based on
the following acts:
(a) Received training at an al Qaeda training camp;
(b) Served as a driver for [O]sama bin Laden
transporting him to various locations in Afghanistan;
(c) Served as [O]sama bin Laden’s armed bodyguard at
various locations throughout Afghanistan;
(d) Transported weapons or weapons systems or other
supplies for the purpose of delivering or attempting to
deliver said weapons or weapons systems to Taliban or
al Qaeda members and associates.62
The commission found that Hamdan intentionally provided support to
al Qaeda knowing that al Qaeda was “an international terrorist
organization engaged in hostilities against the United States,” and “such
organization ha[d] engaged or engages in terrorism,” and that his
contributions would “facilitate[] communication and planning used
for . . . act[s] of terrorism.”63
Was Hamdan a DPH? Of the four acts offered by the prosecution,
only section “d” could arguably be considered a hostile act. According
to the ICRC Guidance, the civilian driver of an ammunition truck would
be considered a DPH if delivering “to an active firing position at the
front line” whereas he would not be if “[t]ransporting ammunition from
a factory to a port for further shipping to a storehouse in a conflict zone”
because such transportation would be “too remote from the use of that
ammunition in specific military operations.”64 The same logic would
apply to the transportation of weapons. Although arguably he was
punished in part for direct participation in hostilities, the gravamen of
his offense was his direct support to al Qaeda before the outbreak of
61
Mr. Hamdan was acquitted of conspiracy to attack civilians, commit murder in
violation of the law of war, destroy property, engage in terrorism and murder of U.S. and
coalition members. See United States v. Hamdan, Report of Result of Trial (August 7, 2008).
62
United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1258 (U.S. Ct. Military Comm’n
Review 2011) (en banc).
63
Id. at 1258, 1274.
64
GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 56.
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armed conflict in Afghanistan. Like Hicks, Hamdan received an
exceedingly light sentence (sixty-one months, with credit for fifty-five
months served).
3.

Ali Hamza al Bahlul

The next person to be convicted in a military commission was Ali
Hamza al Bahlul.65 Mr. al Bahlul was convicted of conspiracy to commit
various offenses, solicitation to commit various offenses, and providing
material support to terrorism. Mr. al Bahlul was a long-time member of
al Qaeda and served as a personal secretary and media advisor to Osama
bin Ladin. The charges were based largely on pre-9/11 activities.66 It
was not alleged that Mr. al Bahlul attacked U.S. or coalition troops, or
otherwise participated directly or indirectly in the armed conflict in
Afghanistan. Mr. al Bahlul received a life sentence. His appeal of his
conviction was denied by the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review
on September 9, 2011.67
4.

Mohammad Jawad

Hicks, Hamdan, and al Bahlul were the only persons convicted
under the 2006 MCA, but there was one other case initiated under the
law that presents the clearest example of prosecution of a detainee for
direct participation in hostilities. The case ended not in conviction, but
in dismissal of all charges, followed by release.
The prosecution of Mr. Jawad, whom I represented,68 was perhaps
the most notable failure of the military commissions.69 It was also the
case that relied most clearly on a direct participation in hostilities theory.
As one military commentator has observed, the case was based

65
In addition to my civilian position as a law professor, I am a Lieutenant Colonel in the
U.S. Air Force Reserve Judge Advocate General’s (“JAG”) Corps. In my JAG capacity, I
served as a Defense Counsel with the Office of Military Commissions from April 2008 to
August 2009. During this time, I was Mr. al Bahlul’s appointed military counsel, but he
requested that I remain silent during the trial, a request that I honored. Because Mr. al
Bahlul’s request to represent himself was denied, no defense was offered at his trial.
66
Charge Sheet of Ali Hamza al Bahlul at 1–2, United States v. al Bahlul (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/AE%201-13.pdf.
67
United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR 09-001 (U.S. Ct. Military Comm’n Review Sept. 9,
2011) (en banc), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
al-Bahlul-USCt-Mil-Comm-Review-Sept-9-2011-1.pdf.
68
See supra note 65 (providing Frakt’s credentials and presenting another case where he
represented a defendant in his JAG capacity).
69
See Frakt, supra note 12.
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exclusively on Jawad’s alleged direct participation in hostilities.70 In fact,
Jawad is the only person to have been charged in the military
commissions to date who was not charged with at least one terrorismrelated offense (conspiracy, material support to terrorism, or terrorism),
and who was not alleged in the charges to be a member of al Qaeda, the
Taliban, or an associated group. Rather, Jawad, an Afghan citizen, was
charged with attacking U.S. soldiers. Specifically, Jawad was alleged to
have thrown a hand-grenade that injured two uniformed U.S. soldiers
and their civilian interpreter. The grenade attack occurred in a crowded
bazaar in downtown Kabul, Afghanistan on December 17, 2002. The
assailant threw the hand-grenade through the rear window of a military
vehicle.
Based on this incident, Jawad was charged with three specifications
(counts) of “Attempted Murder in Violation of the Law of War” and
three specifications of “Intentionally Causing Serious Bodily Injury.”71
The serious bodily injury charges were later dismissed by the judge on a
motion by the defense,72 when he found them to be a lesser included
offense of the attempted murder charge. The defense also filed a motion
to dismiss the attempted murder charges on the basis that the facts
alleged did not constitute a violation of the law of war. The defense’s
motion asserted that throwing a hand grenade—a lawful weapon―at
enemy soldiers in a military vehicle—a lawful target―did not violate the
law of war, and therefore the military commission lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the offense.73 The government responded that Jawad’s

70
See Gregory, supra note 12, at 150–51 (arguing that in light of the difficulty of
prosecuting alleged unlawful combatants, such as Jawad, in the military commissions, the
UCMJ should be revised to provide jurisdiction over those who directly participate in
hostilities, enabling Jawad to be prosecuted for criminal offenses not amounting to a
violation of the law of war).
71
Charge Sheet of Mohammed Jawad at 3–4, United States v. Jawad (U.S. Ct. Military
Comm’n Review Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jan2008/
d20080130jawadcharge.pdf.
72
Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge II and its Specifications for Multiplicity and
Unreasonable Multiplication of Charges (D-006) at 1, United States v. Jawad (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 23, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/Jawad%20-%20D%20-%20006%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss%20Charge%20II.pdf.
This motion was granted orally by the military judge. See Transcript of Record at 411,
United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba June 19, 2008).
73
Defense Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense and for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction under R.M.C. 907 (D-007) at 7, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 28, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20080528Defense Motion To Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense-Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction D-007.pdf (“In sum, Mr. Jawad did not commit an attack against a protected
person or through a prohibited means. Even assuming he qualifies for personal
jurisdiction as an unlawful enemy combatant, this status does not convert his alleged
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status as an unlawful combatant, a civilian not entitled to participate in
the conflict, rendered any hostile acts in which he engaged violations of
the law of war.
The military judge flatly rejected the government’s theory. In his
ruling, issued September 24, 2008, the judge held that “the propriety of
the charges in this case must be based on the nature of the act”—the
“method, manner or circumstances” of the attack—not merely the status
of the actor. 74 He rejected “the proposition that acting as an unlawful
enemy combatant, by itself, is a violation of the laws of war.”75
However, based on an assertion by the government that it had additional
evidence to support a law of war violation,76 a claim the prosecution later
admitted was untrue,77 the judge declined to grant the defense motion to
dismiss the charges. Interestingly, although the prosecution ostensibly
won the motion because the charges were not dismissed, the government
was so dissatisfied with the judge’s ruling that it filed a motion for
reconsideration.78 In the reconsideration motion, the government took
the unusual step of requesting the judge to dismiss the charges if he was
unwilling to amend his ruling to permit the government to proceed on
its unlawful combatancy theory, so that it could have the option of filing
an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Military Commission
Review.79 The government took great pains to emphasize the critical
nature of the ruling on this “central and hotly contested issue” to the
viability of the military commissions themselves, by noting the “seminal
grenade toss into a war crime. This Commission therefore has no subject matter
jurisdiction to try Mr. Jawad for attempted murder and causing serious bodily injury.”).
74
United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 331, 334 (Military Comm’n Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Sept. 24, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
(D-007)).
75
Id. at 332.
76
See Transcript of Record, supra note 72, at 583 (“We’ll play out a lot more facts and
circumstances to show that it goes beyond just a mere status as the basis of the charge.”
(quoting Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson, Assistant Trial Counsel)); id. at 706 (“At one of the
previous sessions, Colonel Stevenson, my recollection is, when asked by myself, you
offered a position that the government would be able to prove a law of war violation
without reference to status.” (quoting Colonel Henley, Military J.)).
77
See Government Reply to Defense Response to Motion for Reconsideration (D-007) at
12, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 21, 2008),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20081104JawadD007Reconsider.pdf
(beginning on p. 15) (“Under the military judge’s current construction of the M.C.A., the
evidence the government intends to offer at trial will not establish the requirement of the
‘in violation of the law of war’ element as the military judge construes it.”).
78
Government Motion for Reconsideration (D-007), United States v. Jawad (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/d20081104JawadD007Reconsider.pdf (beginning on p. 2).
79
See Government Reply to Defense Response to Motion for Reconsideration, supra note
77, at 12.
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importance of this issue to multiple pending and anticipated cases for
which this case may appear to set a precedent,” and by articulating “the
importance of this ruling to this and future cases.”80 Lest there be any
doubt about it, the government reiterated in the closing paragraph of its
filing “that [the] issue is of central importance to this case, specifically,
and to the military commission process, in general.”81
Despite these pleas, the motion for reconsideration was summarily
rejected by the judge, who called the government’s arguments
“unpersuasive.” He reiterated that “proof that the Accused is an alien
unlawful enemy combatant alone will be insufficient at trial to find the
alleged acts of attempted murder in this case were in ‘in violation of the
law of war.’”82 Nevertheless, Judge Henley declined to dismiss the
charges, informing the prosecutors that it was their ethical obligation to
do so if they could not prove them.83
Judge Henley’s ruling was not an aberration. In the two other cases
to consider the issue, the military commission judges similarly rejected
the prosecution’s theory that the mere status of being an unlawful
combatant amounted to a violation of the law of war. Several weeks
before the ruling in Jawad, in United States v. Hamdan, Judge Keith Allred
refused to give a government requested jury instruction “that unlawful
belligerency is a per se violation of the law of war,”84 stating “there is no
offense under the law of war of murdering a lawful combatant.”85 A few
weeks after the Jawad ruling, in United States v. al Bahlul, Judge Ronald
Gregory also refused to give the prosecution’s requested jury instruction
identifying unlawful belligerency as a violation of the law of war,
adopting instead Judge Henley’s formulation from his ruling in the Jawad
case.86 These rulings placed the continued viability of some military
commission cases in serious jeopardy, as the government planned to rely

80
Id. at 6, 10, 12; see also infra Part V.A.4.b.1 (discussing an example of one of the pending
cases to which the prosecution refers).
81
Government Reply to Defense Response to Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 77,
at 12.
82
Transcript of Record at 708, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba Sept. 25, 2008) (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review).
83
See id. (“[T]he government always has an ethical obligation to not proceed to trial,
knowing that it can’t prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The prosecutors declined
multiple requests from the defense to voluntarily dismiss the charges while awaiting a
decision on their interlocutory appeal of another ruling by Judge Henley, granting a
defense motion to suppress. Id.
84
Transcript of Record at 3765, United States v. Hamdan (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/20-21Hamdan-1 Aug and 4 Aug 08-FINAL-3648-3890 Redacted.pdf.
85
Id. at 3823.
86
See Frakt, supra note 12, at 1388–89 nn.119–20.
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on the status of the accused in other cases. For example, the government
was also relying on an unlawful combatancy theory in the pending case
against Canadian juvenile Omar Khadr. Khadr’s trial was next on the
military commission docket when Judge Henley issued his rulings in the
Jawad case.
Both Jawad’s and Khadr’s cases were put on hold when President
Obama suspended all military commission activity shortly after
assuming office in January 2009. During this suspension period, the U.S.
District Court took up Jawad’s long dormant habeas corpus petition.87
Initially, the Justice Department asserted that Jawad met the standard for
detention as an enemy combatant because he had thrown a handgrenade at U.S. forces, the same factual basis underlying the military
commission charges. In July 2009, after more than six and a half years in
U.S. military custody, the Justice Department changed its mind,
concluding that Jawad was not an enemy combatant after all, and
dropped its opposition to the petition.88 The writ was granted on July 30,
2009, and Jawad was ordered released.89 The next day, the military
commission charges were dismissed.90 In August 2009, Jawad returned
to Afghanistan.91
On the same day of Jawad’s final habeas hearing, I was invited to
testify before a House Judiciary Subcommittee considering proposals to
reform the military commissions. I attempted to convince Congress that
the MCA should be amended to make it clear that simply participating
in hostilities without legal authority, in other words, being an
unprivileged belligerent, did not convert all hostile acts into war crimes.
In my testimony, I urged Congress to adopt Judge Henley’s reasoning in
the Jawad case and include the following language in the MCA: “The
87
See Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Mohammed Jawad
(Also Known as Saki Bacha) at 2, Al Halmandy v. Bush, No. 05-cv-2385 (D.D.C. Jan. 13,
2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/natsec/amended_jawad_20090113.pdf; see
also Al Halmandy v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46–48 (D.D.C. 2009) (providing the order
amending the Case Management Order and directing the government to respond to the
petition and illustrating that the original petition was filed in 2005, and an amended
petition was not filed until nearly four years later in January 2009).
88
See Notice that Respondents Will No Longer Treat Petitioner as Detainable Under the
AUMF and Request for Appropriately Tailored Relief, Al Halmandy v. Obama, No. 05-cv2385 (D.D.C. July 24, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/
alhalmandyvobama_govtfiling.pdf.
89
See Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2365846, at *1 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009)
(presenting the order granting Jawad’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
90
See Letter from Susan J. Crawford, Convening Auth. for Military Comm’ns (July 31,
2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Direction%20of%20CA%20-%20Jawad%
2031%20JUL%202009.pdf.
91
See, e.g., Associated Press, Guantanamo Detainee Released, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at
A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/world/asia/25gitmo.html.
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mere status of being an unprivileged enemy belligerent, without more, is
insufficient to establish that an act was ‘in violation of the law of war.’”92
I proposed that Congress define the phrase “in violation of the law of
war” to mean “in a method or manner or under circumstances which
violate the law of war.”93 But I also warned Congress that if it properly
limited the military commissions to traditional law of war violations,
“there is not going to be anybody to try.”94 This assertion prompted a
follow-up question to me from Committee Chair Jerrold Nadler:
Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Can I just clarify one question
before we go on to the next statement? Why did you say
there would be nobody to try in . . . properly constituted
military commissions for law of war violations?
Major Frakt. Because, Mr. Chairman, none of the people
that have been charged have been charged with actual
law of war offenses.
Now, I want to say there is one exception to that.
There is a crime called murder in violation of the law of
war, which sounds like a war crime. Certainly, if a
murder was in violation of the law of war, that would be
a war crime.
However, the prior Administration took the position
that murder in violation of the law of war was simply
murder by an unprivileged belligerent or murder by an
enemy combatant.
In other words, the mere status of being an unlawful
combatant—the jurisdictional prerequisite was—
converted any act of fighting, any act of attempt to kill
U.S. soldiers, into a war crime . . . that has been
challenged by the defense counsel in the military
commissions.
We have [had] three different judges in three
different cases decide that the government’s
interpretation of that law was wrong and that what
Congress really intended was that in violation of the law
of war means that there was something in the manner or

92
Proposals for Reform of the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
90, 105 (2009) (statement of Major David J. R. Frakt, U.S. Air Force Reserve, Lead Defense
Counsel, Office of Military Commissions—Defense).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 91.
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method or circumstances that violated the law of war
beyond simply being an unlawful combatant.
So we don’t have examples of during the actual
armed conflict of people committing traditional law of
war offenses.95
Perhaps not surprisingly, given many Congress members’ strong
preference to try Guantánamo detainees before military commissions,96
my suggestion to amend the MCA in a way that would limit the number
of detainees who could be tried was not adopted. In fact, the MCA of
2009 made no significant changes to the list of crimes that could be
charged. All of the offenses that potentially criminalized direct
participation in hostilities were left intact. But the question remained
whether the DOD would continue to pursue its interpretation of these
crimes, in light of the multiple decisions at the trial level rejecting its
theory. It took several months before this question was answered.
As it had been in 2006, the DOD was the lead agency responsible for
drafting implementing regulations to the MCA of 2009.97 In April 2010,
the DOD issued a new MMC,98 which included the elements of the
crimes, as well as explanatory comments. Interestingly, the new MMC
omitted the prior comment upon which the government had relied in
earlier prosecutions based on unlawful combatant status,99 instead
substituting the following perplexing language:
[A]n accused may be convicted in a military
commission . . . if the commission finds that the
accused . . . engaged in conduct traditionally triable by
military commission (e.g., spying, murder committed
while the accused did not meet the requirements of

Id. at 107–08.
In fact, this preference is now enshrined in law, as Congress has barred the transfer of
detainees to the United States even to face criminal charges in federal court. See Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124 Stat.
4137, 4351 (2011); Ann Riley, Obama Signs Law Barring Transfer of Guantanamo Detainees to
US for Trial, JURIST (Jan. 9, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/01/obama-signs-lawbarring-transfer-of-guantanamo-detainees-to-us-for-trial.php.
97
See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (Supp. III 2009) (“Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures,
including elements and modes of proof, for cases triable by military commission under this
chapter may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.”).
98
See U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS (2010).
99
See id. pt. IV, § 6(13)(d), at IV-11 (2007) (“For the accused to have been acting in
violation of the law of war, the accused must have taken acts as a combatant without
having met the requirements for lawful combatancy.”).
95
96
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privileged belligerency) even if such conduct does not
violate the international law of war.100
The italicized language seems to be an acknowledgment that the
mere act of fighting by an unprivileged belligerent, even if it results in
killing an enemy soldier, does not violate the international law of war.
What prompted the DOD to withdraw the earlier comment? Why
did they abandon their steadfast position that direct participation in
hostilities (“tak[ing] acts as a combatant without having met the
requirements for lawful combatancy”) violates the international law of
war? According to an article in the New York Times, the change was
prompted by concerns expressed by the Legal Advisor to the State
Department, Harold Koh, that the continued use of such language would
have implications for the CIA Predator drone program.101 Specifically,
Mr. Koh “pointed out that such a definition could be construed as a
concession by the United States that C.I.A. drone operators were war
criminals.” The Obama administration has repeatedly claimed that CIA
drone strikes are consistent with the law of war since only enemy
combatants (lawful military targets) are attacked. But it would be
impossible to argue that CIA drone operators, civilian government
employees or government contractors, are themselves lawful enemy
combatants. What they are, in fact, are civilians directly participating in
hostilities. Thus, when “top lawyers for the State Department and the
Defense Department . . . tried to square the idea that the C.I.A.’s drone
program is lawful with the United States’ efforts to prosecute
Guantánamo Bay detainees accused of killing American soldiers in
combat,”102 they couldn’t do so.
But while the DOD may have been willing to finally acknowledge
that the international law of war does not support the theory of DPH as a
war crime, they were clearly not ready to give up on the possibility of
prosecuting DPH in a military commission. So “[t]hey redrafted the
manual so that murder by an unprivileged combatant would . . . be
treated like espionage—an offense under domestic law not considered a
war crime.”103 Thus, the comment asserts that if an unprivileged
100
Id. § 5(15)(c), at IV-13 (2010) (emphasis added). This comment also purports to apply
to three other offenses (intentionally causing serious bodily injury, destruction of property
in violation of the law of war, and spying) and is repeated four times in the MMC. See id.
101
Charlie Savage, U.N. Official to Ask U.S. to End C.I.A. Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
2010, at A8; see also Morris Davis, Combatant Immunity and the Death of Anwar al-Awlaqi,
JURIST
(Oct.
17,
2011),
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/10/morris-davis-anwar-alawlaqi.php.
102
Savage, supra note 101.
103
Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

752

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

belligerent kills a soldier, he can be prosecuted if such conduct is deemed
by a commission to be conduct “traditionally triable in a military
commission.” While Congress purported to authorize military
commissions to try crimes that are traditionally triable by military
commissions even if not recognized as war crimes by modern
international tribunals,104 it is hard to reconcile the assertion that murder
in violation of the law of war can be committed “even if such conduct does
not violate the international law of war” with the title or the elements of this
offense. Indeed, one of the listed elements of the offense in the MMC is
that “[t]he killing was in violation of the law of war.”105 Although
comments in the Manual are not binding on military commission
judges,106 the views of the Manual’s drafters carry significant weight in
the military commissions, which have virtually no precedents to guide
them. Would a military judge follow the new comment in the Manual
and actually instruct a military commission jury that murder in violation
of the law of war could be based on conduct that does not violate the law
of war? The first potential opportunity to answer this question came
almost instantly, as the 2010 MMC was released just as pretrial hearings
in United States v. Khadr were about to resume.107
B. Prosecution of Omar Khadr under the MCA of 2009
Canadian juvenile Omar Khadr is the clearest example of a detainee
being prosecuted and convicted for direct participation in hostilities.
Among other offenses, Khadr was charged with murder in violation of
104
See 10 U.S.C. § 948b (2006) (“Military commissions generally (a) Purpose.—This
chapter establishes procedures governing the use of military commissions to try alien
unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by
military commission.” (emphasis added)); 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) (“The provisions of this
subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable under the law of war or
otherwise triable by military commission.”).
105
Id. § 5(15)(b)(5), at IV-13.
106
The Manual for Courts-Martial, upon which the MMC is based, indicates in its
Preamble that the supplementary “Discussion” in the Manual for Courts-Martial “[does]
not constitute rules” and “[does] not create rights or responsibilities that are binding on
any person, party, or other entity.” U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL pt. I, § 4, at I-1
(2008). Further, “[f]ailure to comply with matter set forth in the supplementary materials
does not, of itself, constitute error.” Id. at I-2; see also United States v. Mance, 26 M.J. 244,
252 (C.M.A. 1988) (noting that interpretations of substantive elements of punitive articles
by the executive branch are not binding on the judiciary).
107
See David Frakt, New Manual for Military Commissions Disregards the Commander-inChief, Congressional Intent and the Laws of War, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2010, 6:23 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-c_b_557720.html
(noting the release of the new MMC “on the eve of Omar Khadr’s suppression hearing, the
first major military commission hearing at Guantanamo since President Obama took
office”).
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the law of war for killing a U.S. soldier with a hand grenade during a
prolonged battle between U.S. forces and al Qaeda and affiliated fighters.
“The specification of Charge I against Mr. Khadr merely alleges that he
took part in a conventional battle, during which he used a conventional
weapon (a hand grenade) in response to a conventional assault by U.S.
forces.”108
The stipulation of fact entered into evidence at Khadr’s trial stated
that Khadr was in a fortified compound with other fighters surrounded
by U.S. and coalition forces. The coalition forces allowed the women and
children inside the compound to exit unharmed and urged the fighters
inside to give themselves up before the battle began. When they refused,
the battle commenced. Khadr fought back, throwing a hand grenade
that proved fatal to a U.S. soldier. During the firefight, Khadr was shot
multiple times and severely injured.109 Khadr’s defense team filed
multiple pre-trial motions seeking to have the murder charge dismissed
on the basis that it was not a legitimate war crime, all of which were
rejected.110 The defense also requested that the judge provide jury
findings instructions defining this offense in advance of the trial.111 The
defense wanted the jury instructions to reflect the rulings of the other
commission judges, which was the mere status of being an unprivileged
belligerent and engaging in hostilities was insufficient to satisfy the
required element of a law of war violation, contrary to the government’s
theory.112 The government wanted the judge to indicate that he would
give jury instructions consistent with the comment in the manual that
108
Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge I for Failure to State an Element of the Offenses in
Violation of Due Process at 1, United States v. Khadr (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba July 11, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Khadr%20D071%20%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss%20-%20Due%20Process.pdf.
109
Stipulation of Fact at 7–9, United States v. Khadr (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/pdf/omar-khadr-charges.pdf.
110
See Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge I for Failure to State an Offense and for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 2, United States v. Khadr (Military Comm’n Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2008/Khadr%
204%20-%208%20Feb%202008%20Motion%20Session.pdf (“The charge of murder in
violation of the law of war must be dismissed because the specification fails to state an
offense; it does not allege a killing that violates the law of war.”).
111
Defense Response to Government’s Request for Finding’s Instruction on Charges I, II
and III (as it pertains to Murder in Violation of the Law of War) and Defense Cross-Motion
to Dismiss and Strike (P-009), Appellate Ex. 295 at 14, United States v. Khadr (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Nov. 28, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/AE-295-AE295-E(P009).pdf.
112
In fact, the defense requested the same instruction as given in United States v. al Bahlul.
See CMCR 09-001 (U.S. Ct. Military Comm’n Review Sept. 9, 2011) (en banc), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/al-Bahlul-USCt-Mil-CommReview-Sept-9-2011-1.pdf; Defense Cross-Motion to Dismiss and Strike, supra note 111,
Appellate Ex. 295-B at 24.
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allowed murder in violation of the law of war to be proved based on
unprivileged belligerency.113 The judge refused to reveal the instructions
he intended to give, leaving both sides unclear as to what proof would
satisfy the elements of the offense. The uncertainty over the legal
standard to be applied at the trial was one factor that drove both sides to
enter into plea negotiations, which ultimately led to Khadr’s guilty plea
to all charges in the fall of 2010. Thus, Omar Khadr became not only the
first child soldier to be convicted of war crimes in modern history, but
also the first person to be convicted in the military commissions
explicitly under a direct participation in hostilities theory.
Unfortunately, because of the guilty plea, the government’s new
theory—as reflected in the comment in the 2010 manual—that murder of
a soldier by an unprivileged belligerent need not violate the international
law of war in order to constitute murder in violation of the law of war
was not tested at trial and will not be reviewed on appeal. The
prosecution’s awareness of the weakness of the legal theory behind the
murder charge may have been a factor in the very favorable plea bargain
Mr. Khadr received.114 It remains to be seen whether the military
113
See Defense Cross-Motion to Dismiss and Strike, supra note 111, Appellate Ex. 295.
The government’s requested instruction read, in pertinent part:
For the accused to have been acting in violation of the law of war, the
accused must have taken acts as a combatant without having met the
requirements for lawful combatancy.
The term “lawful enemy combatant” means a person who is:
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged
in hostilities against the United States;
(B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized
resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such
hostilities which meet all of the following criteria:
(1) are under responsible command,
(2) wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance,
(3) carry their arms openly, and
(4) abide by the law of war; or
(C) a member of a regular armed force who professes
allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not
recognized by the United States.
Failure to meet at least one of the above three criteria renders an
individual an unlawful combatant making any combatant acts by that
individual violations of the law of war.
Id. at 12.
114
Khadr, facing a maximum life sentence, received an eight-year sentence, which was to
be served in Canada after one more year in Guantánamo. Paul Koring, Verdict’s in: Khadr
is
Ottawa’s
Problem
Now,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Oct.
31,
2010),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/verdicts-in-khadr-is-ottawas-problemnow/article1779878/. However, as of April 2012, the transfer to Canada has not taken
place. The United States blamed Canada for the stalled transfer. See Charlie Savage, Delays
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commission judges (and appellate courts) will overlook the apparent
contradiction in the non-binding comment in the manual, or follow the
more compelling reasoning of Judge Henley.
However, two recent
rulings by the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review strongly
suggest that this first-level appellate court would be likely to uphold a
military judge who followed the comment in the manual.
C. The Court of Military Commission Review, United States v. Hamdan
The first significant indication about the reception that the
government’s unprivileged belligerency theory is likely to receive on
appeal arrived in June 2011. It was the U.S. Court of Military
Commission Review’s first review of a military commission conviction.
As discussed previously, Salim Hamdan was convicted in August 2008
of providing material support for terrorism. On appeal, Hamdan argued
that his conviction was void for several reasons. Most importantly, the
subject of this article was his first argument:
First, he contends the military commission, established
pursuant to Congress’s Article I power to “define and
punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,” lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the offense of providing
material support for terrorism, because it is not a
violation of the international law of war.115
The question of whether material support for terrorism violates the
international law of war is, of course, different than whether direct
participation in hostilities violates the international law of war, but the
two issues are closer than they may initially appear. The MCA version
of providing material support for terrorism requires both that the
perpetrator be an unlawful enemy combatant and that the conduct take

Keep Former Qaeda Child Soldier at Guantánamo, Despite Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012,
at A24. The Canadian government blamed the United States. See Jeff Davis, Federal
Government Blames U.S. for Stalled Omar Khadr Repatriation, POSTMEDIA NEWS (Mar. 27,
2012), http://www2.canada.com/story.html?id=6368760. He is now reportedly likely to
be transferred to Canada by late May 2012. See Colin Perkel, Deal Could See Omar Khadr
Return to Canada by End of May:
Source, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/deal-could-see-omar-khadr-return-tocanada -by-end-of-may-source/article2384731/?service=mobile. Under Canadian law, he
will be eligible for parole as soon as he arrives, based on his eight years of confinement in
Guantánamo before sentencing. Id.
115
United States v. Hamdan, CMCR 09-002, at 10 (U.S. Ct. Military Comm’n Review June
24, 2011) (en banc) (alteration in original), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
0621hamdan.pdf.
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place in the context of an armed conflict.116 In finding that material
support for terrorism did, in fact, violate the international law of war, the
U.S. Court of Military Commission Review made clear its view that
virtually any direct participation in an armed conflict by an unlawful
combatant would constitute a war crime. In support of this proposition,
the court cited authorities going back to the Civil War, including the
Lieber Code and other Civil War era precedents regarding guerrilla
fighters.117 The opinion also quoted this passage from a 1914 Army Field
Manual:
Persons who take up arms and commit hostilities
without having complied with the conditions prescribed
for securing the privileges of belligerents, are, when
captured by the enemy, liable to punishment for such
hostile acts as war criminals.118
The Court then noted that the 1956 version of the Army Field
Manual also “permits prosecution of unlawful combatants or
unprivileged belligerents as war criminals.”119 There was no discussion
of any of the voluminous contrary authority from the past fifty-five
years, including recent U.S. Army publications.120 The fact that this
Id. at 30–32.
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863).
118
WAR DEP’T: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 130, ¶ 369 (Gov’t
Printing Office 1914).
119
Hamdan, CMCR 09-002, at 71 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10,
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956)). The Army Field Manual states the following:
80. Individuals Not of Armed Forces Who Engage in Hostilities
Persons, such as guerrillas and partisans, who take up arms and
commit hostile acts without having complied with the conditions prescribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents, are, when
captured by the injured party, not entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war and may be tried and sentenced to execution or imprisonment.
81. Individuals Not of Armed Forces Who Commit Hostile Acts
Persons who, without having complied with the conditions pre-scribed
by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents, commit hostile acts
about or behind the lines of the enemy are not to be treated as
prisoners of war and may be tried and sentenced to execution or
imprisonment. Such acts include, but are not limited to, sabotage,
destruction of communications facilities, intentional misleading of
troops by guides, liberation of prisoners of war, and other acts not
falling within Articles 104 and 106 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and Article 29 of the Hague Regulations.
Id. at A-21, ¶¶ 80–81 (internal citations omitted).
120
See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 16 (2011), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
116
117
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opinion was issued by the court en banc and without dissent is a
powerful indication that the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review,
at least, is likely to affirm any military commission conviction based
upon direct participation in hostilities by an unprivileged belligerent.
Whether higher federal courts will follow suit remains to be seen.121 The
U.S. Court of Military Commission Review issued its second ruling on an
appeal from a conviction in United States v. al Bahlul, on September 9,
2011. Al Bahlul was not a DPH, and his appeal did not directly raise the
issue of whether unprivileged belligerency was a war crime, but the
court once again took the opportunity to endorse the theory of
unprivileged belligerency as a punishable offense under the law of war,
as it cited Ex parte Quirin for the proposition that unlawful combatants
could be tried and punished “for acts which render their belligerency
unlawful.”122 However, there was one passage in the opinion that
suggested that the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review might balk
at approving a conviction for belligerent acts even if such conduct does not
violate the international law of war. The opinion, in pertinent part, states:
We are not persuaded by the Government’s suggestion
that Congress’ power to “define and punish . . . .
Offences against the Law of Nations,” U.S. Const., art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10, even when exercised in collaboration with the
President in a time of armed conflict, includes the power
to make conduct punishable by military commission
without any reference to international norms.123
This passage suggests that if there are future prosecutions of detainees
based on direct participation in hostilities, such as a charge of murder in
violation of the law of war based on killing a U.S. soldier, the
government may have to convince the U.S. Court of Military
Commission Review that such a crime finds support in IHL, something
operational-law-handbook_2011.pdf (“Unprivileged belligerents may include . . . civilians
who are participating in the hostilities or who otherwise engage in unauthorized attacks or
other combatant acts. Unprivileged belligerents (a/k/a unlawful combatants) are not
entitled to POW status and may be prosecuted under the domestic law of the captor.”); see
also DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 233–37 (explaining the distinction between unlawful
combatants and war criminals).
121
See United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR 09-001 (U.S. Ct. Military Comm’n Review Sept. 9,
2011) (en banc), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
al-Bahlul-USCt-Mil-Comm-Review-Sept-9-2011-1.pdf. The CMCR ruling is currently on
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and may ultimately be decided by
the Supreme Court.
122
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31(1942).
123
al Bahlul, CMCR 09-001 at 23–24 (emphasis added).
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that the government has thus far been unable to do at the trial level, and
which the government itself no longer is asserting.
D. Current U.S. Practice Related to the Prosecution of DPH
In addition to Khadr, there have been three other guilty pleas under
the MCA of 2009.124 Although none of these cases have involved direct
participation in hostilities, one of the cases merits some discussion
because it includes charges of murder and attempted murder in violation
of the law of war. In March 2012, Majid Khan pled guilty to conspiracy,
spying, material support to terrorism, murder in violation of the law of
war, and attempted murder in violation of the law of war and agreed to
cooperate with the prosecution in other military commission cases in
exchange for a nineteen year sentence.125 The charges, referred February
15, 2012,126 reflect a possible change in the prosecution’s approach to the
offense of murder in violation of the law of war. The charge of murder
in violation of the law of war is based on Mr. Khan’s involvement in the
bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta Indonesia in August 2003.
According to the charge, what made this murder “in violation of the law
of war” was that the persons killed were “protected persons” (civilian

124
Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi, Noor Uthman Muhammed, and Majid Shoukat
Khan. Mr. al Qosi and Mr. Muhammed both pled guilty to conspiracy and providing
material support to terrorism. See Report of Result of Trial, United States v. al Qosi (Aug.
11, 2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Report%20of%20Result%20of%20
Trial,%20US%20v.%20al%20Qosi.pdf; Charge Sheet of al Qosi, United States v. al Qosi
(Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080305alqosi charges.pdf;
Charge Sheet of Muhammed, United States v. Muhammed (Dec. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf; Offer for Pretrial
Agreement, Appellate Ex. 123 at 2, United States v. Muhammed, available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/AE%20123%20-%20Offer%20for%20Pretrial%20
Agreement.pdf. Mr. al Qosi admitted to being a long time driver and bodyguard for
Osama bin Laden before 9/11. Charge Sheet of al Qosi, supra. He was not alleged to have
participated in the post-9/11 armed conflict in Afghanistan, other than “provid[ing]
security and transportation for bin Laden and other al Qaeda members.” Id. at 4. Mr.
Muhammed was convicted solely for his pre-9/11 activities with al Qaeda and was not
alleged to have participated, directly or indirectly, in the post-9/11 armed conflict in
Afghanistan. Charge Sheet of Muhammed, supra.
125
Pre-Trial Agreement, Majid Shoukat Khan (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click Majid Shoukat Khan, then
“Show all Case Documents,” then “Majid Shoukat Khan Pre-Trial Agreement”); Pre-Trial
Agreement, App. A, Majid Shoukat Khan (Feb. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click Majid Shoukat Khan, then
“Show all Case Documents,” then “Appendix A to Pre-Trial Agreement”).
126
Referred Charges, United States v. Majid Shoukat Khan (Feb. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click Majid Shoukat Khan, then
“Show all Case Documents,” then “Referred Charges Dated 2/15/2012”).
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tourists) under the law of war.127 Mr. Khan was also charged with
attempted murder in violation of the law of war for the same bombing
(to account for all the hotel guests who were not actually killed) under
the same theory. Mr. Khan was charged with an additional count of
attempted murder in violation of the law of war for an assassination plot
against then President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf. The charge
indicates that this attempt violated the law of war and not merely
Pakistani domestic law, because Khan wore a vest containing an
“improvised explosive device” to a “mosque where he expected
President Musharraf to be.”128 The wearing of an explosive vest under
civilian clothes violates the general requirement that combatants carry
their arms openly and also could be construed as perfidy under the law
of war.129 Also, according to a stipulation of fact signed by Mr. Khan,
“the vest was outfitted with small ball bearings that would scatter upon
detonation in order to create what the Accused called a ‘killing machine’
that inflicts maximal death and damage.”130 Such a weapon could
arguably be considered an indiscriminate weapon, which might also
violate the law of war.
Mosques are protected places under the law of war and generally
not subject to attack, so a bombing that took place in a mosque,
particularly when filled with civilian worshippers, could also plausibly
be considered a violation of the law of war.131 If the charges against Mr.
Khan are any indication, the prosecution may no longer seek to rely
solely on the accused’s status as an unprivileged belligerent as the basis
for an assertion that an accused’s direct participation in hostilities
violates the law of war. The three other active military commission cases
tend to confirm this view.
The only other charges brought under the MCA of 2009 thus far are
against the alleged 9/11 co-conspirators, an alleged co-conspirator in the
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al
Nashiri, and Ali Musa al Daqduq al Masawi (commonly referred to as
127
In fact, “Murder of Protected Persons” is a specific offense under the MCA. See 10
U.S.C. § 950t(1) (2006). One wonders why the prosecution did not simply charge this
offense.
128
Khan Referred Charges, supra note 126.
129
Perfidy is also a specific offense under the MCA. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(17); see also
Laurie Blank, Taking Distinction to the Next Level: Accountability for Fighters’ Failure to
Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 765, 785–86 (2012) (explaining how
the concept of perfidy has been defined under international conventions).
130
Stipulation of Fact, Majid Shoukat Khan (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click “Majid Shoukat Khan,”
then “Show all Case Documents,” then “Majid Shoukat Khan Stipulation of Fact”).
131
“Attacking Protected Property” is another distinct offense under the MCA. See 10
U.S.C. § 950t(4).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

760

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Daqduq), a Lebanese man who is suspected of being a Hezbollah
operative accused of killing several American soldiers in Iraq in 2007.132
However, the charges against these individuals are not based on direct
participation in hostilities. Although all of these individuals are charged
with the ubiquitous murder and attempted murder in violation of the
law of war offenses, each of the charges indicate a specific violation of
the law of war beyond the status of unprivileged belligerency. In Mr. al
Nashiri’s case, the one charge of murder in violation of the law of war
and the two charges of attempted murder in violation of the law of war
that he is facing all recite acts of perfidy as the specific violations of the
law of war.133 In the case against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et al, better
known as the 9/11 case, the alleged co-conspirators are also charged
with murder in violation of the law of war and destruction of property in
violation of the law of war for their involvement in the plot to use
hijacked civilian airliners as guided missiles to attack civilian targets and
kill civilians.134 If one accepts the premise that 9/11 was part of an
armed conflict, then the manner, method and nature of these attacks acts
clearly were in violation of the law of war. The charges against Daqduq
have echoes of the charges against Mohammed Jawad and Omar Khadr
in that he is accused of murdering, attempting to murder, and
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to U.S. soldiers with firearms
and grenades, in violation of the law of war.135
However, unlike the charges against Mr. Jawad and Mr. Khadr, each
charge cites at least one, and in some cases, two reasons why the attacks
on the U.S. soldiers violated the law of war. Each of the charges asserts
that Daqduq’s crimes occurred “while wearing the U.S. military or Iraqi
police uniform in violation of the law of war.” Donning the uniform of
the enemy in order to gain their confidence and get close enough to kill
132
Charlie Savage, Man Tied to Hezbollah Faces U.S. Military Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2012, at A12. Daqduq is currently in Iraqi custody and is the first person from the conflict
in Iraq to face military commission charges.
133
Referred Charges, United States v. Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al Nashiri,
(Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click “Abd al Rahim Hussayan
Muhammad al Nashiri,” then “Show all Case Documents,” then “Referred Charges Dated
12/19/2008”). Interestingly, Mr. al Nashiri is also charged with perfidy as a separate
offense. Id. at 8.
134
Referred Charges, United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Military
Commissions.aspx (click “Khalid Sheikh Mohammad et al (2),” then “Show all Case
Documents,” then “Referred Charges Dated 4/4/2012”).
135
The charges against Mr. al-Musawi, unlike all the other military commission cases, are
not posted on the official military commissions website, www.mc.mil, but rather can be
found at: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/302052-daqduq-tribunal-charge
sheet. html.
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or capture them is a perfidious act clearly prohibited by the law of war.
Four of the charges also assert that Daqduq is responsible for the
shooting of individual U.S. soldiers while the soldier “was a protected
person placed out of combat.”136 Soldiers become protected persons
under the law of war when they are “hors de combat” due to
incapacitating injuries, or have been captured, which is what is alleged to
have occurred in this case.137
Although Congress declined to adopt my proposed formulation that
“in violation of the law or war means in a manner or method or under
circumstances which violate the law of war,” the charges in the three
active military commission cases suggest that the prosecutors at the
military commissions have now adopted this approach voluntarily.
At this point, it seems unlikely that we will see any more
prosecutions in military commissions at Guantánamo for simple attacks
on coalition soldiers, such as the attack originally alleged to have been
committed by Mohammed Jawad. The U.S. government stopped
transporting detainees to Guantánamo several years ago, and the Obama
administration has determined not to bring any more detainees there.138
Although the current administration identified thirty-six potential
candidates for prosecution in military commissions, the focus of
prosecutorial efforts appears to be on those believed to be responsible for
major terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies, such as 9/11
and the attack on the destroyer U.S.S. Cole, rather than foot soldiers.139
In the United States’ recent conflict in Iraq, the prosecution of
civilians who directly participated in hostilities was, quite properly,
handled by the domestic court system.140 Indeed, in Iraq, the United
136
Charge Sheet of Ali Musa Daqduq al Musaw; United States v. al Musaw: (Military
Comm’n Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/302052-daqduq-tribunal-chargesheet.html.
137
Although it is not clear from the charges themselves, Mr. Daqduq is not alleged to
have personally participated in the attack that resulted in the deaths and injuries of the U.S.
service members, but rather is charged in his role as an organizer of the attacks. In this
respect, his case is similar to the case against KSM et al and al-Nashiri. Those defendants
did not personally participate in the attacks, which were carried out by suicide bombers,
but rather are alleged to have organized or “masterminded” the attacks, making it even
more difficult for the prosecution to rely on a direct participation in hostilities as a war
crime theory in these cases.
138
Josh Gerstein, John Brennan: No New Prisoners to Guantanamo Bay, POLITICO (Sept. 8,
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/62990.html. Of course, this was
before Daqduq was charged. If the Iraqis ever hand him over to the United States, it is
unclear where he would be tried. There is no legal requirement that military commissions
be held at Guantánamo.
139
GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 13.
140
See David Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 1, 32 n.82 (2011). Daqduq could potentially be the first exception to this policy.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

762

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

States followed this approach from early in the conflict, turning over
captured insurgents to the Iraqi Central Criminal Court to be prosecuted
under domestic criminal or anti-terrorism laws. Under the Obama
administration, the United States has now also adopted this model in
Afghanistan, building the Parwan Detention Center, which is intended
to be an Afghan-run prison complex, and turning over responsibility for
prosecution of captured insurgents to the Afghani legal system.141 Thus,
current U.S. practice is consistent with customary international law of
war in treating direct participation in hostilities as a domestic crime
rather than a war crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
America’s unprecedented effort to characterize all direct
participation in hostilities as a war crime and punish it as such has
largely been a failure—yielding only one guilty plea based on a direct
attack on U.S. soldiers—after nearly a decade of efforts to prosecute
Guantánamo detainees in military tribunals. The prosecution of Omar
Khadr, a juvenile at the time of his participation in the conflict, was
widely criticized by the international community. His unappealable
guilty plea is unlikely to be viewed as setting new precedent in
customary international law that direct participation in hostilities is a
war crime.
Given that prosecutors could not convince even a single military
commission judge to endorse the theory of direct participation in
hostilities as a war crime, it seems doubtful that this theory might have
ever have gained much traction in the international community. With
the publication of the 2010 MMC, it appears that the United States has
abandoned the claim that DPH is a war crime, even while continuing to
assert that civilians who take up arms against U.S. forces can be
punished in a military commission for non-war crimes triable by military
commission.
While the reason that the United States abandoned the position that
DPH was a per se war crime is clear, what is not clear is why the United
States pursued this novel theory of war criminality so vigorously in the
first place when it had such weak support. By declaring that there were
no lawful combatants on the other side of the war on terror, and that all
hostile acts against U.S. soldiers were war crimes, the United States

141
However, the handover of this facility’s control to the Afghan government has been
delayed “well beyond January 2012.” Kevin Sieff, Afghan Prison Transfer Delayed, WASH.
POST (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/afghanprison-transfer-delayed/2011/08/12/gIQApCGMBJ_story_1.html.
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appears to have been seeking to provide U.S. soldiers general protection,
or immunity from attack, similar to that enjoyed by U.N.
Peacekeepers.142 But while there is a clear interest of the international
community in protecting international peacekeepers, there is no similar
concern in the international community with protecting U.S. soldiers.
Accordingly, the United States’ effort to unilaterally alter the law of war
through its prosecution practices was doomed to fail, even if the CIA’s
drone program had not caused the United States to reconsider.
In the future, if the United States seeks to create new customary
international law, it should focus on criminalizing acts that are of greater
global concern than routine attacks on U.S. troops. For example, one
problem that the United States has encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq
is the presence of foreign fighters, jihadists, drawn across international
borders to the fight because of ideological opposition to the United States
or the U.S.-backed governments. These foreign fighters are akin to
mercenaries, albeit motivated by ideology rather than “the desire for
private gain.”143 Such ideological mercenaries increasingly participate in
armed conflicts around the globe, a very unwelcome development for
the international community. A more narrowly drafted war crime
focused on penalizing direct participation in hostilities by those who
cross international borders—as alien insurgents—for the specific
purpose of engaging in hostilities would be more likely to gain
international recognition as a viable new offense under the law of war.
Australian David Hicks would have been a good candidate for
prosecution for such an offense, as would Canadian Omar Khadr—
although Khadr’s youth, and the fact that he was brought to Afghanistan
by his father would make the case against him considerably weaker.
Daqduq, a Lebanese citizen who travelled to Iraq to help train insurgents
to fight coalition soldiers, would perhaps be the ideal test case for such a
crime. The prosecution of alien insurgents is far more likely to resonate
with world sentiment than the prosecution of someone like Mohammed
Jawad, an Afghan citizen, for allegedly committing a hostile act against a
foreign Army in his own country during an internal armed conflict.
Indeed, given the increasing international recognition of the right of
citizens to take up arms against oppressive, tyrannical, and corrupt
governments as part of the universal right of self-determination (as seen

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 48, at art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(iii)
(establishing as a war crime acts of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against
personnel . . . involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations”).
143
Protocol I, supra note 10, at art. 47(2)(c).
142
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most clearly in the recent civil war in Libya), the trend is likely to be
greater protection for at least some DPHs, rather than less.
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